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Many investors purchase open-end mutual funds through intermediaries, paying
brokers and financial advisors for fund distribution and advice via alternative sale
charge fee structures. We argue that the fee structure choice reveals valuable infor-
mation about investors horizon. That allows portfolio managers to manage liquid-
ity more efficiently, and to improve performance by timely matching their invest-
ment choices to the underlying investment horizon of their investors. Mutual funds
with more committed capital hold shares longer, invest in more illiquid stocks, and
take advantage of securities with slow-moving arbitrage opportunities, i.e., fire-sale
stocks, innovative stocks. This evidence reveals an overlooked shadow cost of dis-
intermediation in the mutual fund industry.
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I Introduction
Investors can purchase mutual fund shares through different channels. If the investment
takes place through a financial advisor or the fund is distributed by a broker or dealer
(who may be the same as the advisor), share classes usually include a load fee.1 Investors
can also buy no-load shares, which have no sales charges. No-load shares are traditionally
associated with funds sold directly to the investor. More recently, though, broker-sold
funds may also offer no-load shares to investors.
There is ample evidence that broker-sold funds underperform the average actively
managed fund (Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009)) as their managers either have
weaker incentives to generate alpha (Del Guercio and Reuter (2014)); prioritize their com-
pensation incentives over those of their clients (Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto (2013)
and Chalmers and Reuter (2020))); or cater to a clientele that values nonperformance
characteristics (Del Guercio and Tkac (2010)). These articles, however, are silent about
the information conveyed to managers by investors’ choice among different share classes.
We document that mutual fund intermediaries can add value by operating on informa-
tion that clients convey about ex-ante commitment to hold investments longer, through
their choice among sale charge fees. This information allows mutual fund managers to
better anticipate flows and to capitalize on slow-moving arbitrage opportunities and the
return premium on illiquid assets. Our findings reveal a long-term “shadow cost” of disin-
termediation in the mutual fund industry, a phenomenon that may shape the investment
decisions of portfolio managers.
The decoupling of financial advice and investment together with recent demand for
passive (and cheaper) financial assets like exchange-traded funds has put strong pressure
on mutual fund fees and in particular on front- and back-end load fees.2 Given the
1There are broadly three load fee structures. Class A shares charge a relatively high front-end sales
fee when the shares are purchased and a relatively low annual level fee (also known as 12b-1 fee). Class
B shares have a lower or no front-end fee but include a contingent deferred sales charge (CDSC) to
be paid when shares are redeemed. This charge can be waived if the investment is held for a long
predetermined period. The annual level fee, in this case, is usually higher than that of the first structure.
Finally, investors may pay a relatively higher annual level fee for Class C shares, but they are exempt
from paying a front-end load fee. This structure may include a relatively low CDSC if the shares are
liquidated during the first year.
2Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005) suggest that management companies are replacing one-off explicit
load fees with higher periodic operating costs, which investors find more difficult to isolate and identify.
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evidence on the underperformance of broker-sold funds, mutual fund investors should find
it advantageous to invest in mutual funds without paying explicit load fees for financial
advice. Our research challenges this view.
We conjecture that investors who select share classes with sizeable front- or back-end
load fees reveal a rational ex-ante capital commitment to hold such an investment longer
than investors who select share classes with no front- or back-end loads but higher annual
fees (henceforth level-load shares) or investors in no-load shares. Thus a fund manager
can infer a capital commitment from these investors. If our conjecture is right, we expect
manager behavior, investment strategies, and ultimately fund performance, to be affected
by fund investors’ choices among investment fee structures.
We examine actively managed US domestic equity mutual funds over the 1992-2016
period. For each fund and each month in our sample, we define Capital Commitment
as the proportion of a fund’s total net assets (TNA) that comes from share classes with
sizeable front- or back-end loads. Analogously, we define no-load and level-load investors
to constitute the proportion of a fund’s TNA that comes from no-load and level-load
shares, respectively.
Whether investor choice among fee structures reveals capital commitment is ultimately
an empirical question. In principle, when financial advisors guide investors in their share
class choice, a key element should be how long the investor expects to hold the shares. Yet,
the literature has shown that financial advisors may have incentives to guide investors
into share classes that maximize advisor long-term fees rather than those that better suit
the investment horizon of their clients. Sophisticated investors may also avoid load fees
altogether, whatever their investment horizon (Del Guercio and Reuter (2014)), while the
choice of front-load fee shares may be driven by discounts in the sales fee if the initial or
future invested amount surpasses certain breakpoints, regardless of the investor’s horizon.
First, we find that higher capital commitment is associated with lower fund flow
volatility. Additionally, managers in funds with a higher proportion of capital commit-
ment can predict more accurately future flows by adjusting their current cash holdings
to time them. Altogether, we interpret this as evidence that, inspite of the underlying
conflicts of interests between brokers and investors, fund flows are more stable and pre-
dictable when the percentage of TNA that comes from front- and back-end load shares
3
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3353344
increases, consistent with higher capital commitment.3
Second, using the portfolio duration measure of Cremers and Pareek (2016), we show
that managers increase their duration when the fund’s capital commitment is higher.4
This suggests that managers exploit their investors’s commitment to hold their invest-
ment for a longer period. We then investigate the performance implication of this commit-
ment. Funds with higher capital commitment exhibit higher alpha. This result is robust
when we control for institutional investors and, importantly, for no-load funds, arguably
more likely to be sold directly. In other words, among load-share funds (more likely to be
distributed through brokers or dealers), those with higher capital commitment perform
better. This finding is robust when we control for the evaluation period of portfolio man-
agers who receive performance-based compensation (as a proxy for managerial explicit
incentives), funds with redemption fees (as a substitute for capital commitment), and
managers’ evaluation period (to capture career incentives). Then, we decompose fund
holding duration into the part projected by the fund’s committed capital and the part
orthogonal to committed capital. Our tests confirm that only the projected part pre-
dicts fund outperformance over long-term investment horizons. This is consistent with
the idea that patient investment strategies is indeed related to superior performance,
but only when managers match their portfolio horizon to the investment horizon of the
underlying investors.5
Thrid, we explore the potential channels through which more stable capital affects
both the investment choices of portfolio managers and fund performance. We find that
managers of funds with more committed capital benefit from an illiquidity return pre-
mium (Amihud (2002)) because they can hold more illiquid stocks and reduce portfolio
turnover. They also capitalize on the return predictability associated with stocks in which
research and development (R&D) investment is more intense.6 Finally, following Ed-
3These results hold when we consider front- and back-end load fees separately, suggesting that
managers interpret both load shares as ex-ante capital commitment. They are similar after we exclude
no-load share classes from the control group, hence compare only load funds. This alleviates concerns
that we are capturing unobservable differences across load versus no-load share classes. Results remain
robust after we control for the holdings of institutional investors (as a proxy for sophisticated investors).
4Results are similar when we use the horizon measures of Lan, Moneta, and Wermers (2015).
5We also examine fund risk exposure to capital commitment. We find that funds with more com-
mitted capital are more sensitive to aggregate market liquidity as captured by the factor of Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003), and to the long-horizon mispricing factors of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sun (2019).
These results are consistent with the idea that capital commitment allows mutual funds to exploit slow-
moving arbitrage opportunities.
6Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) and Lev and Sougiannis (1996) demonstrate that firms
with high ratios of R&D relative to market equity earn high subsequent returns; Eberhart, Maxwell,
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mans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), we construct a flow-induced pressure variable at the
stock level, conditional on outflows, and find that funds with more committed capital
invest more in fire-sale stocks in the next quarter.7 Overall, our portfolio holding results
show that capital commitment is conducive to long-term risky arbitrage.
We perform a set of robutness tests and discuss alternative explanations of our results.
To address potential endogeneity concerns, we use the discontinuity in the supply of cap-
ital (mostly level-load shares) from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) “Category Kings”
ranking list analyzed in Kaniel and Parham (2017). Our results remain unchanged and
confirm that capital commitment influences portfolio managers’ investment choices. We
then explore if higher capital commitment shows an asymmetric performance-sensitivity
with respect to fund over(under) performance, consistently with capital commitment as
a proxy for investor sophistication. The results are inconsistent with this alternative
explanation. Finally, we analyze a household-level data set from a large US brokerage
house collected by Barber and Odean (2001). The choice of load fee structure reveals
information about households’ capital commitment beyond what the manager can poten-
tially gather from investors’ characteristics when they hire the broker (Johnson (2004)).
Finally, as further evidence that management companies value the information revealed
by the investors share class choice, we show that they are more explicit about the fund’s
long-term investment behaviour in the prospectus after the fund family starts offering
no-load shares.
Our work contributes to several strands of the literature. We add to the literature that
stresses the importance of liquidity management for mutual fund managers (Coval and
Stafford (2007), Agarwal and Zhao (2020), and Chernenko and Sunderam (2016)). We
show that fee structures can help portfolio managers better anticipate and manage flows.
The information embedded in investor choice of fee structure helps managers deliver per-
and Siddique (2004) find that large increases in R&D expenditures predict positive future abnormal
returns, and Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013) show that firm-level innovative “efficiency” (measured as
patents scaled by R&D investment) forecasts future returns. Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013) suggest
the mechanism behind the stock return predictability is likely to be the misvaluation of R&D ability.
Such misvaluation is more likely to be reaped by long-term investors, as complexity in information
processing can lead to a significant delay in impounding of information into asset prices, as argued by
Lauren and Dong (2012), and portfolio managers with short-term horizons have fewer incentives to invest
in information acquisition about firms’ long-term projects (Dow and Gorton (1994) and Goldman and
Slezak (2003)).
7There is evidence that mispriced stocks are riskier for short-term investors and profitable only in
the long run. For instance, Coval and Stafford (2007) show that corrections in stocks sold by outflow-
distressed mutual funds can take up to two years, while Giannetti and Kahraman (2018) find that
closed-end funds are more likely to purchase fire sale stocks than open-ended funds.
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formance by efficiently matching their portfolio strategy to the underlying investment
horizon of the investor. This helps explain why asset management companies and in-
vestors continue to use these financial intermediaries even in the face of reported conflicts
of interest (Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto (2013)) or underperformance (Del Guer-
cio and Reuter (2014)). Financial intermediaries can add value related to share-class
decisions, much more than in selection across funds.
Our findings suggest that an optimal matching of investor and fund investment horizon
can help to overcome a serious impediment to arbitrage that arises in the open-ended
mutual fund structure. Stein (2005) argues that competition for investor funds and
information asymmetry about managers’ ability may lead to more open-end funds, which
are subject to a higher risk of early redemption, at the cost of profitable, unexploited long-
term arbitrage opportunities. Giannetti and Kahraman (2018) present empirical evidence
consistent with this hypothesis by comparing portfolio choices of open-end versus closed-
end funds. Closed-end funds are found to purchase more underpriced stocks with high
arbitrage risk than open-end funds. Open-ended funds are nonetheless the dominant
organizational structure in the asset management industry both in size and number.8
Thus it is important to understand information embedded in load fees and how this
pricing mechanism can give mutual fund managers more freedom to pursue different
investment strategies. We claim that funds with more committed capital are better
equipped to engage in long-term risky arbitrage.
Our results are distinct from hedge fund research on the risk of early liquidation and
its impact on portfolio choices and performance. Aragon (2007) and Agarwal, Daniel, and
Naik (2009), for instance, show that managers in funds with lock-up provisions outper-
form those without them by exploiting a liquidity premium. We add to this literature by
discussing the importance of the fee structure for mutual fund managers; that is, mutual
funds with more committed capital outperform. An important difference is that, unlike
in mutual funds, hedge funds impose explicit restrictions on investors. Our results sug-
gest that efficiently matching mutual fund investor horizons, and not necessarily locking
investors in, is what drives outperformance.
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on managerial myopia or short-termism
by demonstrating the important role for the horizon of the underlying capital. Agarwal,
8According to the 2018 ICI Factbook, the total volume of assets in open-end mutual funds was $18.3
trillion, while the volume of closed-end mutual funds was $275 billion.
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Vashishtha, and Venkatachalam (2018) for instance, show that managers may overlook
profitable long-term investments for career concern reasons. They show that recent reg-
ulation forcing higher disclosure of managers’ portfolio holdings exacerbates this concern
and causes less investment in R&D in firms where institutional investors have a sig-
nificant stake. We also investigate the interaction between institutional investors and
R&D capital, where we show that underlying mutual fund investor short-termism may
induce portfolio managers to reduce their exposure to firms with longer-term prospects
for success.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data used. We then
present the impact of capital commitments on investor behavior in Section III. Section
IV analyzes the portfolio manager’s investment strategy and performance. Finally, in
Section V we check the robustness of our results and discuss alternative interpretations.
Section VI concludes.
II Data
We examine actively managed US domestic equity mutual funds over the 1992-2016 pe-
riod. Our sample comprises 3,955 funds across 899 asset management companies. We use
the CRSP Survivorship-Bias Free Mutual Funds Database to obtain fund and manage-
ment company information, including fund load structure information and general fund
characteristics. We collect fund level inflows (sales) and outflows (redemption) data from
N-SAR question 28a-f. Redemption fees data come from Morningstar. We measure fund
holding durations as in Cremers and Pareek (2016). We also use portfolio holdings from
Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database (S12) to construct holdings-based
trading horizon measures as in Lan, Moneta, and Wermers (2015). All stock-level price
information is from CRSP, and the accounting variables come from Compustat. We use
the Wall Street Journal “Category Kings” ranking list from Kaniel and Parham (2017).
We create our primary independent variable using the share classification system of
the Investment Company Institute (ICI). For every fund, we define Capital Commitment
as the fraction of the fund’s total TNA that comes from front- and back-end load shares
in a given period. All variables are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix.
[Insert Figure 1 about here ]
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Panel A of Table 1 reports the sample mean, standard deviation, and distribution of
TNA by share class. On average, 31.70% of fund TNA qualify as capital commitment,
of which 26.24% have front-end loads and 5.46% back-end loads. Level share classes
represent on average about 20% of fund TNA, and 38% of TNA is in no-load shares.
Figure 1 illustrates the divergent trends of front-end and no-load share classes in the
sample. Back-end load shares have become negligible while the proportion of level-load
shares, although still sizeable, has been declining since 2005.
Panel B reports fund and family characteristics. The average fund has USD 1,948
million total net assets (TNA), in a family with an average of 161 funds. The average
fund is 13 years old and has an annual turnover of 89%. On average, funds have an annual
expense ratio of 1.28% and turnover of 89% per year. They hold about 5% of their assets
under management in cash and their average gross return is about 0.9% per month. In
terms of fees, the average front (back) load is 4% (2%). On average, 22% of the fund’s
assets belong to institutional investors and about 17% of funds have a redemption fee.
[Insert Table 1 about here ]
It is worth noting that our share-class classification is different from the direct-sold
versus broker-sold classification in the Finance Research Corporation (FRC) data that
are used in Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009), Del Guercio and Tkac (2010),
and Del Guercio and Reuter (2014). Most notably, our key variable, Capital Commit-
ment, varies within direct- and broker-sold funds depending on the proportion of share
classes with sizeable front- and back-end loads relative to level-load and no-load shares.
Higher capital commitment is certainly associated with a higher likelihood of a broker
distribution channel. Yet, two funds identified as broker-sold may have different degrees
of capital commitment and thus, we argue, convey different information about investor
horizon to their particular managers. Likewise, two funds, one direct-sold and the other
broker-sold, may have the same or very similar capital commitment. In general, the
mapping between direct-sold and no-load funds, on the one side, and brokered-sold and
load funds on the other, is much more blurred nowadays than in the sample period used
in the previously cited articles.
American Funds, for instance, is the largest wholesale broker-sold family according to
Del Guercio and Tkac (2010). In the process of choosing the best share class “with your
8
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financial professional,” American Funds claims it is important to consider the investment
horizon, the objective, and the amount to invest.9 Class A American Funds shares carry
a front-load and lower annual expenses than other share classes. In the case of class C
shares, there is no front-end load, but the annual fees are higher. In November 2016,
American Funds decided to issue no-load shares for the first time in what was considered
as “the end of an era” of brokered-only investment. On the other side, Fidelity is the
largest direct-sold fund family.10 Fidelity funds are sold in a variety of share classes
including load-fee shares (classes A, B, and C) and no-load shares. These funds will vary
on their level of capital commitment, even if they are classified as direct-sold.
A potential concern is that our primary variable of interest, Capital Commitment,
is concentrated mostly in several funds offering only load shares. This would certainly
be a problem, as we would not be able to distinguish between the share classes and the
funds themselves. Figure 2 shows this is not the case. We classify a fund as a Multi
Share Class fund if it offers load and no-load share class options (the blue line in Figure
2). The single-share class funds offer only load shares (classified as Pure Load funds) or
no-load shares (classified as Pure No-Load funds), corresponding to the green and red
lines in Figure 2, respectively. The percentage of Multi Share Class funds has steadily
increased during our sample period, reaching more than 50% of funds at the end of the
sample period. This has happened mainly at the expense of Pure Load funds, which
have declined almost monotonically to currently represent slightly more than 20% of the
sample. Pure No-Load funds have accounted for a relatively stable 20% share of the
sample since 2005.
[Insert Figure 2 about here ]
There might still be an endogenous choice of share class structures across funds
that possibly caters to different types of investors. To tackle this issue, we follow a
multi-pronged strategy. First, we control for fund and family features in our tests. Sec-
ond, we show that our results are robust after including fund fixed effects to control for
unobservable (fixed) fund characteristics. We also test the robustness of our findings
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capital commitment to capture exogenous variation and identify the effect on portfolio
investment strategies.
III Flow Stability and Capital Commitment
We begin by analyzing whether investors’ share class choice reflects their investment
horizon. Early research on mutual fund share classes points in this direction. Chordia
(1996) argues that load fees can be structured to dissuade redemptions, while Nanda,
Wang, and Zheng (2009) postulate that the launch of level- and no-load shares may
increase the level and volatility of fund inflows and attract investors with short and
uncertain investment horizons.
On the other side, more recent research suggest that brokers may prioritize their
compensation incentives over the interest of their clients (Christoffersen, Evans, and
Musto (2013) and Chalmers and Reuter (2020)). If this conflict is strong enough, ill-
advised investors may end up choosing the wrong share class. Additionally, the choice
of front-load fee shares may be driven by discounts in the sales fee if the initial or future
invested amount surpasses certain breakpoints, independent of the investor’s horizon. In
all these cases, we expect that share classes reveal no differential information about the
underlying investors’ horizon. This will be our null hypothesis.
We use two proxies for investors’ horizon at the fund level: flow volatility and flow pre-
dictability. The underlying assumption is that higher stability in fund flows reflects longer
investors’ horizon. To test the relation between flow volatility and capital commitment,
we run a pooled regression for every fund i and every quarter t:
Flow V olatility i,t+24 = β0 + β1Capital Commitment i,t + β2Controls i,t + µi,t + εi,t, (1)
where Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly inflows and outflows obtained
from the NSAR filings in the following 24 months. Since our analysis is on a quarterly fre-
quency, for the monthly variables we take the end-of-the-quarter monthly value. Capital
Commitment is the proportion of total assets under management coming from the addi-
tion of front- and back-end load share classes. We also replace Capital Commitment with,
simultaneously, the variables Back and Front Investors, which represent the percentage
of fund TNA in the corresponding share classes. We standardize all the continuous share
10
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class variables to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. We apply this transfor-
mation to make it easier to compare each variable’s impact, where estimated coefficients
denote the impact of a one-standard-deviation change in the explanatory variable.
Controls include: Fund Size(log), Family Size(log), the number of Family Funds(log),
Expense Ratio, the average Load Fee and Fund Age(log). We also control for the per-
centage of fund TNA invested by No-Load and Institutional Investors. µi,t represents
time × fund style fixed effects to control for unobservables related to fund manager trad-
ing behavior that vary over time and within investment objective. Standard errors are
clustered at the fund level.
The object of interest is the coefficient β1 in equation (1). Under the null hypothesis,
the conflict of interest between brokers and investors is strong enough such that the share
classes that we identify with higher capital commitment are unrelated to flow volatility.
In that case, β1 should not be different from zero. Column 1 of Table 2 strongly rejects the
null hypothesis. Funds with higher capital commitment exhibit, on average, lower fund
flow volatility over the following 24 months. A one-standard-deviation increase in capital
commitment is associated with 0.118 standard deviations lower flow volatility, which is
equivalent to a 21.2% (= (0.118 × 0.063)/0.035) reduction in mean flow volatility. In
column 2, we replace the commitment variable in equation (1) with the standardized
percentage of the fund’s TNA held, separately, by Back and Front Investors. Flow
volatility is significantly lower for every one standard deviation in the percentage of fund
TNA in the hands of, respectively, back and front investors, though the effect of front-end
loads seems to have a slightly larger impact.
The results remain robust and strongly significant at the 1% level even after controlling
for the percentage of TNA invested in no-load shares (in column 3) or held by institutional
investors (in column 4). This suggests that our results are not driven by some (no-load)
direct-sold fund families or by sophisticated institutional investors, and that both back-
and front-end investors indeed contribute to the near-future stability of the fund flows.11
[Insert Table 2 about here ]
11In an additional robustness test, we separate fund flows into inflows and outflows as obtained from
NSAR filings. Flow Volatility in equation (1) is replaced with, respectively, the volatility (standard
deviation in the next 24 months) of monthly inflows, outflows, and net flows in Table A2 of the Appendix.
The negative relation between flow volatility and our measure of capital commitment is robust across all
specifications.
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As a second proxy for investor horizon, we use flow predictability, defined as the
manager’s ability to anticipate fund flows and, thereby, better manage the fund’s liquidity.
We measure this ability through the variable Net Fund Flows Prediction, defined as the
R-squared from the regression of current net fund flows (inflows - outflows) on the cash
holdings of the previous month over a rolling window of 36 months. The R-squared
captures how portfolio managers adjust their cash balance to fund flows, given what
managers know before time t about the investors’ horizon. In other words, we test how
good managers are at managing cash based on what they learn from investor’s share class
choice.12
Table 3 presents the results of equation (1) after replacing, for each fund i and ev-
ery quarter t, Flow Volatility with Fund Flows Prediction. Under the null hypothesis,
share class choice is disconnected from the investors’ horizon: higher capital commit-
ment fails to improve upon the predictability of fund liquidity needs. If this is true, β1
should be no statistically different from zero. We standardize all continuous variables
for ease of interpretation and use the same controls. The evidence strongly rejects the
null hypothesis. A one-standard-deviation increase in capital commitment is associated
with 0.064 standard deviations higher prediction ability, which is equivalent to a 10.05%
(= (0.064 × 0.11)/0.07) increase over mean prediction ability. This prediction ability
seems to be coming from both back and front-end investor flows. Portfolio managers in
funds facing No-Load Investors in column 3 of Table 3 are significantly poorer at antic-
ipating fund flows and adjusting their cash balances accordingly. Institutional investors
also exhibit more volatile flow behavior, making anticipation more complicated. Once we
control for institutional ownership in column 4, the impact of a one standard-deviation
increase in capital commitment increases flow predictability by 0.052 standard deviations.
All coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
[Insert Table 3 about here ]
Overall, investors in share classes with entry and exit loads are associated with lower
fund flow volatility and more predictable flows. Arguably, this should allow portfolio
managers to manage cash balances more efficiently. The evidence is robust when we
12Results hold when we use a forward-looking approach that regresses prediction ability at t + 36 on
current capital commitment.
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consider front- and back-end share classes separately and after we control for institu-
tional investors and pure no-load funds. These results suggest that the potential conflict
of interest between brokers or financial advisors and their clients do not prevent share
classes from revealing information about investors’ horizon. In particular, front- and
back-end investors show stronger long-term capital commitment. Next, we test whether
this commitment is related to fund managers’ investment strategy.
IV Capital Commitment and Investment Strategy
Even if investors purposefully choose those share classes that better fit their investment
horizon, managers may disregard this information because it is redundant or because
they lack the adequate incentives to exploit it. Using client-level data on fund share
transactions, Johnson (2004) shows that fund managers can make inferences about their
clients even in the absence of a load shares. The evidence in Del Guercio and Reuter
(2014) suggests that managers broker-sold funds (more likely to use load shares) have
weaker incentives to generate alpha than those sold directly (more likely to use no-load
shares). Del Guercio and Tkac (2010) show that broker-sold funds cater to a clientele
that values nonperformance characteristics. Following these arguments, we should ex-
pect no relation between fund investors’ capital commitment and fund managers’ trading
turnover, performance, and portfolio stock selection. That is our null hypothesis.
Under the alternative hypothesis, the percentage of capital commitment influences
fund investment horizon, in that managers pursue more long-term strategies by holding
stocks longer in a portfolio. Lan, Moneta, and Wermers (2015) and Cremers and Pa-
reek (2016) both show that a longer investment horizon has a positive impact on fund
performance. Thus, we will also test the relation between capital commitment and fund
performance via the manager’s investment horizon.
A Trading Duration
To test the relation between investors’ capital commitment and the managers’ trading
duration, we run the following regression for every fund i and quarter t:
Trading Duration i,t = β0 + β1Capital Commitment i,t + β2Controls i,t + µi,t + εi,t, (2)
13
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where Trading Duration, introduced by Cremers and Pareek (2016), is based on quarter-
end holdings and measures the average length of time (weighted by the size of each
stock position) that the fund has held equities in the portfolio over the last five years.
Capital Commitment is defined as before. We also replace capital commitment with
the percentage held by Back-load and Front-load Investors separately. Controls include,
besides previous control variables: Fund Cash, Manager Tenure, Fund Flows, and Flow
Volatility. µi,t represents time × objective fixed effects. We standardized the dependent
variable and the main independent variables for ease of interpretation. Standard errors
are clustered at the fund level. Results are reported in Table 4.
Under the null hypothesis, β1 is no different from zero. The evidence, however,
strongly rejects the null hypothesis. There is a positive correlation between capital com-
mitment and managers’ holding horizon. In column 1, a one-standard-deviation increase
in capital commitment is associated with 0.050 standard deviations higher trading du-
ration, which is equivalent to a 3.53% (= (0.05 × 3.63)/5.14) increase over the mean
holding period. We see also a positive correlation when we separate capital commitment
into back- and front-end load assets under management in column 2. All coefficients
on these variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. When we control for no-
load investors in column 3 or institutional investors in column 4, coefficients on Capital
Commitment remain positive and significant at the 5% level, and with similar size.
The effect persists even when we control for family-specific unobservables by intro-
ducing family fixed effects in Table A3 in the Appendix. All coefficients on Capital
Commitment are statistically significant at least at the 5% level.13
[Insert Table 4 about here ]
To test the robustness of these results, we introduce additional controls in Table
A5, included in the Appendix. To discourage short-term trading, some mutual fund
companies charge a redemption fee within a specified time frame. In column 1 we control
for the presence of a redemption fee. The coefficient on Capital Commitment remains
the same and again significant at the 1% level.
13In Table A4 in the Appendix, we corroborate the trading duration findings using alternative horizon
proxies like the fund’s annual Turnover Ratio from CRSP and three duration measures from Lan, Moneta,
and Wermers (2015). Generally, a fund that trades frequently tends to have high turnover and a short
holding horizon. Consistently, we find a negative and significant relation between the assets managed
with entry and exit loads and fund turnover. Regardless of the duration measure used, we document a
positive and significant correlation between the manager’s trading duration and Capital Commitment.
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In the second specification, we control, additionally, for the percentage of TNA that
comes from No-Load Investors. The coefficient on Capital Commitment remains positive
and of a similar size, and statistically significant at the 5% level. In this second column,
the control group is the level share class (typically, C share class). Thus, portfolio man-
agers condition their investment decisions on whether assets under management come
from share classes with front- or back-end loads as compared to the level share class
where the investment horizon is expected to be shorter. This alleviates concerns that
we are capturing unobservable differences across load versus no-load share classes. Ad-
ditionally, there is no statistically significant relation between assets under management
coming from no-load investors and the holding period of the manager.
To control for the possibility that capital commitment is proxying for investor so-
phistication, we introduce the percentage ownership of institutional investors in the third
specification. The coefficient of Capital Commitment remains positive and significant at
the 5% level. The coefficient on Institutional Investors is strong and negatively related
to trading duration.
In the fourth column, we control for the manager’s incentives by adding the evalu-
ation period in their compensation contract, provided it is based on fund performance
as collected by Ma, Tang, and Gomez (2019). The coefficient on Capital Commitment
increases with the addition of this control variable, and it remains statistically significant
at the 1% level. Qualitatively, the results hold unchanged when we control, additionally,
for no-load investors (in column 5) and the holdings of institutional investors (in column
6).
B Fund Performance
The evidence in Table 4 suggests a relation between fund managers’ investment horizon
and the information conveyed by investors’ capital commitment. The question we inves-
tigate now is whether higher capital commitment is reflected in higher fund performance.
The evidence from previous studies strongly suggests that broker-sold funds underper-
form funds sold directly. In principle, under the null hypothesis, there should be no
difference in (under)performance independently of wether investors in broker-sold funds
invest mostly in front- or back-load shares versus level-load shares. Under the alternative
hypothesis, a higher percentage of front- or back-load shares represents higher investor’s
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capital commitment. Therefore, we first test wether capital commitment enhances the
manager’s ability to outperform.
We run the following regression:
FundPerformance ni,t = β0 +β1Capital Commitment i,t +β2Controls i,t +µi,t + εi,t, (3)
where Fund Performanceni,t represents the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha of fund i over
the next n months as of period t. We follow Fama and French (1993), and Kamara,
Korajczyk, Lou, and Sadka (2016) and calculate the risk-adjusted abnormal returns over
the next n periods, with n ∈ {1, 12, 24, 36} months. The four-factor alpha is obtained
by regressing buy-and-hold portfolio returns on the corresponding buy-and-hold Carhart
(1997) four factors with the same holding horizon. The compounded alphas are then
annualized. We use both gross and net returns. The gross monthly returns are com-
puted by adding 1/12 of the expense ratio to the net returns. The controls in this case
include Fund and Family Size, Expense Ratio, Front and Back Load and Fund Flows . µi,t
represents time × style fixed effects. We standardized the dependent variable and the
main independent variables for ease of interpretation. Standard errors are clustered at
the fund level. Results are reported in Table 5.
We reject the null hypothesis: there is a positive and significant relation between
Fund Performance and Capital Commitment both for net and gross fund performance.
In column 1, a one-standard deviation in capital commitment is associated with a four-
factor annualized alpha 2.2 basis points higher. This increases to 2.7 basis points when
we control for institutional investors in specification 2. Expectedly, no-load funds (ar-
guably, more likely to be directly distributed) outperform load funds by 5 basis points
annually in specification 3. However, even after controlling for no-load funds, a one-
standard deviation increase in capital commitment is associated with 2.8 basis points
higher performance. Results are similar for net-of-fee alphas.
[Insert Table 5 about here ]
The results in Table 5 show that not all load funds perform equally. Why do funds with
higher capital commitment outperform other load funds? Lan, Moneta, and Wermers
(2015) and Cremers and Pareek (2016) both find that mutual funds with longer holding
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periods outperform funds with short trading horizons.14 Is such outperformance due
completely to the fund manager, or is there a role for the supply of capital? Alternatively,
when the percentage of committed capital declines, does this undermine the manager’s
ability to outperform? To answer these questions, we decompose the manager’s trading
duration into the part predicted by the underlying supply of capital (hence matching the
investors’ horizon) and the part that is orthogonal to it. This residual should capture
managers’ holding horizon choice net of the investors’ horizon predicted by their share
class choice.
To decompose the manager’s trading duration of Cremers and Pareek (2016) into the
predicted and the residual part with respect to capital commitment, we estimate, for
every fund i and every quarter t, the equation:
DurationPredicted i,t = β̂1Capital Commitment i,t + µt + εi,t, (4)
where β̂1 is the coefficient β1 estimated in regression (2) with time × objective fixed
effects. Consequently, we obtain the residual value as:
DurationResidual i,t = Trading Duration i,t −DurationPredicted i,t. (5)
We then run the regression:
FundPerformance ni,t = β0 + β1DurationPredicted i,t + β2DurationResidual i,t +
β3Controls i,t + µi,t + εi,t, (6)
The controls are the same as in (3). We also control for no-load funds. Results are
reported in Table 6. We find that gross outperformance is concentrated in the predicted
component of the trading duration across the different holding periods. Controlling for
fund and family characteristics and time × fund objective fixed effects, a one-standard-
deviation increase in the predicted duration raises the fund’s gross four-factor alpha by up
to 26 basis points on an annualized basis over the next three years (significant at the 1%
level). The component that is orthogonal to the investors’ committed capital, on the other
side, is much smaller economically (about 5 basis points) and significant only in the next
14In Table A6 of the Appendix, we corroborate this finding in our sample using both short- and
long-term alphas, and for both gross and net returns.
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month but not over longer holding periods. This suggests that the matching of manager
and investor investment horizon is key to explain the outperformance associated with
longer trading horizons. Conversely, investors can compromise fund managers’ ability to
outperform if they are impatient and don’t reveal their investment horizon.
[Insert Table 6 about here ]
To determine what exactly portfolio managers in funds with more capital commitment
do differently, we examine the relation between our capital commitment variable and the
various sources of systematic risk a portfolio manager exposes a fund to more closely.
We run the following regression:
SystematicRisk Loading fi,t = β0 + β1Capital Commitment i,t
+Controls ti,t + µt + εi,t, (7)
where Systematic Risk Loadingfi,t is the winsorized beta exposure of fund i returns at
time t to the risk factor f , with f ∈ {MKT, SMB,HML,UMD,PS, PEAD,FIN}.
We estimate the exposure for a rolling window of 36 months using the value-weighted
fund returns regressed on the corresponding factors. The first four factors correspond to
the market, size, value, and momentum risk factors of Carhart (1997). PS is the traded
liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and is estimated jointly with the Carhart
(1997) factors. The liquidity factor captures exposure to aggregate liquidity, which Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003) find to be priced, in that stocks with higher sensitivities to this
factor, i.e., higher liquidity betas, have higher average returns15.
PEAD beta captures a fund’s exposure to short-horizon anomalies as introduced by
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sun (2019), and FIN represents a long-horizon factor that exploits
more long-horizon mispricing. We estimate this as a three-factor model similar to Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Sun (2019). The long-horizon factor is based on information in managers’
decisions to issue or repurchase equity in response to persistent mispricing. The short-
horizon earnings surprise factor is motivated by investor inattention and evidence of
short-horizon underreaction to earnings. Of particular interest is how funds load on
these short- versus long-run mispricing factors as a function of their underlying capital
15The traded factor, PS liquidity, is the payoff on the 10–1 portfolio that is long stocks with the
highest historical liquidity betas and short stocks with the lowest historical liquidity betas.
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commitment. The controls are the same as in equation (6). The factor loadings are
estimated using the methodology in Fama and MacBeth (1973).
Results are reported in Table 7. Capital Commitment is negatively related to the mar-
ket (MKT ) and size (SMB) factors and positively exposed to aggregate market liquidty
(PS liquidity) factor. This suggests that funds with more committed capital capitalize
on a liquidity premium. Over the cross-section, funds with more committed capital seem
to load on the behavioral factors designed to capture long-horizon mispricing (FIN ), but
not the short-run factor (PEAD) consistent with the idea that capital commitment allows
managers to exploit slow-moving arbitrage opportunities.
[Insert Table 7 about here ]
C Stock Selection
How does capital commitment relate to managers’ investment decisions and the type of
stocks they select? In particular, do fund managers invest differently when their under-
lying investors are explicitly providing a long-term capital commitment? Are managers
more likely to invest in illiquid stocks if their investors’ horizon increases? Is the lack of
explicit capital commitment an impediment to exploiting slow-moving trading opportu-
nities that are riskier for funds subject to more volatile flows? To answer these questions,
we analyze three broad strategies whose implementation may vary with the amount of
committed capital.
Illiquid assets provide a return premium (Amihud (2002)) but are costly to liquidate
in the advent of unexpected investor redemptions (fire-sales). We investigate whether
managers with more committed capital are less concerned with fire-sale externalities and
hold more illiquid stocks to enhance fund performance. We use, as a proxy for the
illiquidity of a fund’s stock portfolio, the monthly average of the daily Amihud (2002)
Illiquidity measure.
Funds could also invest in mispriced stocks that are risky to arbitrage because con-
vergence to fundamental value might be slow. Porter (1992) and Hall, Hall, Heaton,
and Mankiw (1993) suggest that investors with short time horizons fail to anticipate
the rewards from long-term investments such as research and development (R&D). Dow
and Gorton (1994) and Goldman and Slezak (2003) argue that the short-term horizons
of portfolio managers make them less prone to invest in information acquisition about
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firms’ long-term projects, such as investment in R&D. As a proxy for (long-term) project
duration, we use investment-related variables as R&D expenses in the previous year over
lagged assets for each stock from Compustat. As an alternative investment variable we
also use the KPSS patent data (1926-2010) as obtained from Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru,
and Stoffman (2017). We calculate the value-weighted average of these measures across
the fund portfolio holdings to obtain a fund-level quantification of this amount of R&D
expense, and call this variable R&D. We lag variables one year to reflect that information
environment the managers face at the time of their portfolio decisions. We expect higher
proportions of committed capital to be positively associated with an investment in these
long-term strategies.
Finally, stocks sold off by flow-induced distressed mutual funds are another source
of mispricing that is slow to correct (Coval and Stafford (2007)). Arguably, this trading
opportunity is riskier for a short-term fund facing frequent redemptions than for a mutual
fund whose asset base has a strong capital commitment. We would therefore expect
funds with higher capital commitment to invest more in fire-sale stocks to benefit from
the correction to fundamental value. Following Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012),
we calculate a flow-induced pressure variable at the stock level by assuming that funds
facing outflows sell shares in proportion to their holdings. We calculate the value-weighted
average of this measure across holdings to obtain a fund-level variable that we call Fire-
sale Stocks. We then test whether funds with a higher amount of assets with entry and
exit loads invest more in the subsequent quarter in fire-sale stocks.
We run a regression for every fund i and quarter t:
Stock Characteristic si,t+3 = β0+β1Capital Commitment i,t+β2Controls i,t+αi+εi,t, (8)
where Stock Characteristicsi,t+3 represents a standardized proxy for the investment strat-
egy s ∈ {Illiquidity, R&D, Patents, Fire-sale Stocks} for fund i next quarter as previ-
ously defined. Capital Commitment is standardized. The controls are the same as before.
αi denotes fund fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. Results
are presented in Table 8.
The higher the fraction of assets in share classes with front- and back-load fees, the
more illiquid the holdings of the mutual funds tend to be, as measured by the Amihud
(2002) Illiquidity variable. In particular, a one-standard deviation in capital commitment
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is associated with an increase of 0.026 standard deviations, which is equivalent to 9.57%
(=(0.026 × 5.08)/1.38)) of the average holdings illiquidity. Funds with a higher fraction
of assets in front- or back-end loads also invest more per standard deviation of capital
commitment in innovative firms as measured by the R&D intensity or patents within
their portfolio choice.
Portfolios with a higher fraction of assets in share classes with front- and back-load
fees, are also funds that seem to take advantage of fire-sale stocks. Overall, our results
are consistent with our hypothesis that load fee structures provide managers with greater
freedom to pursue long-term investment strategies, and invest in more illiquid stocks, and
stocks with more innovative investments, and take advantage of arbitrage opportunities
where corrections are slow.
[Insert Table 8 about here ]
V Robustness Checks and Alternative Interpretations
We have documented a positive correlation between, on one side, managers’ portfolio
turnover, their investment in illiquid assets, long-term innovative, and slow-correcting
misvalued stocks and, on the other side, the amount of committed capital they manage.
In this section we check the robustness of our results and explore alternative interpreta-
tions. In particular, we implement an empirical strategy to identify the effect of capital
commitment on investment strategies. Then, to rule out that capital commitment proxies
for investor sophistication or characteristics that managers can infer otherwise, we run
two additional robustness tests. The first experiment examines the investors reaction to
flows and in particular tests whether committed capital (i.e., front- and back-load shares)
is more responsive to performance. For further evidence at the individual investor char-
acteristics, we use the data from a large US discount broker from Barber and Odean
(2001) as our second robustness test.
A Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) based on the WSJ “Category Kings”
Reverse causality is a potential concern in interpretation of our results. Are managers
catering to the investment horizon of investors, or rather are investors chasing managers
who are more skillful in the long run? Funds may also specialize in certain type of in-
vestors (identified with a given distribution channel) and offer only, or predominantly,
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specific share classes. Another concern is potential omitted variables. Share class choice
may actually reflect investor characteristics other than investment horizon (like investor
sophistication) that covary simultaneously with our definition of capital commitment
(more sophisticated investors may arguably prefer no-load shares) and manager portfo-
lio decisions (more sophisticated investors may be associated with sharper managerial
incentives and better monitoring), which would drive spurious results.
To establish a causal relation between capital commitment and fund manager trading
behavior, we instrument capital commitment with the flow discontinuity based on the
Wall Street Journal (WSJ) “Category Kings” ranking exploited by Kaniel and Parham
(2017). The Wall Street Journal publishes quarterly a list of the top ten performing funds
in investment categories in what is known as the “Category Kings” ranking. Kaniel and
Parham (2017) use this ranking to implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD)
style between the top ten funds as published and the remaining (unpublished) funds.16
They show a strong discontinuity in capital flows for funds on the WSJ list versus the
others.
The WSJ rankings are based on a fund’s previous 12-month returns. We hypothesize
therefore that a ranked fund should attract more short-term investors who purchase level-
load shares through a broker and are unlikely to make a long-term capital commitment.
This allows us to exploit exogenous changes in fund capital commitment from the quasi-
random assignment around the 10th rank to see whether there is a significant treatment
effect of short-horizon capital (lower capital commitment) on the trading behavior of
these fund managers as compared to managers of funds in the 11th position, which are
almost identical but do not make it in the list.
Figure 3 corroborates the findings of Kaniel and Parham (2017) in that there is a sharp
discontinuity in fund net flows (all share classes combined) during the post-publication
quarter, showing that the WSJ list has a causal effect on mutual fund investor behavior.
Figures 4 and 5 further distinguish between the flows coming from the different share class
categories. In line with our hypothesis, flow discontinuity seems to come mostly from the
level-load share class, where we posit that investors have low capital commitment. Figure
6 shows that the overall proportion of fund TNA allocated to funds with front and back-
16The distribution of share classes among funds in the ranking is very similar to the distribution
observed in the overall sample: 35% of TNA is in no-load share classes, 20% in level-load, 25% in
front-end load, 5% in back-end load, and 15% in other share classes.
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end loads (i.e., committed capital) decreases after the publication of the ranking which
indicates a significant change in the investor base.17
We then explore the causal impact of changes in capital commitment on manager
stock selection in the subsequent quarter. We follow an instrumental variable method.
Every quarter, we select the subsample of funds listed as the ten top performers in their
category denoted “Category Kings.” We also include the ten next unpublished best
performers per category. These rankings come from Kaniel and Parham (2017). We
define WSJ Discontinuity as a variable that takes a value of one if the fund is in the
published “Category Kings” ranking, and zero otherwise. We also define the variable
WSJ Rank, which denotes the fund’s actual rank.
In the first stage, we instrument the variable Capital Commitment with the variable
WSJ Discontinuity. We also include the variable WSJ Rank, the control variables in
equation (8), and fund fixed effects. The results are reported in the first column of Table 9.
They validate WSJ Discontinuity as a relevant instrument. The discontinuity is negative
and significantly related (at the 1% level) to the percentage of capital commitment. In
the second stage, we examine how the predicted component of Capital Commitment from
the first stage influences managers’ investment decisions in the next quarter. We again
include the same control variables and fund fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the fund level in both stages. Results are reported in the last four columns of Table 9.
An increase in the fund’s predicted capital commitment leads managers to invest sig-
nificantly more in illiquid securities in the subsequent quarter. We also observe that they
increase their investment in innovative firms, as proxied by R&D expenses and patents.
We find no evidence on the other hand to support that higher capital commitment in-
creases manager holdings in the next quarter of fire-sale stocks.18
We conclude that a shock to capital commitment flows primarily affects fund liquidity
17To further corroborate the visual evidence, Table A7 in the Appendix reports the difference in
means among several variables between funds ranked 10 and funds ranked 11. There is no statistical dif-
ference among inflows coming from capital commitment or no-load share classes but a sizeable difference
(significant at the 1% level) in level-load flows.
18The exclusion restriction of our instrument can be challenged, as any increase in the predicted
capital commitment around the discontinuity is, simultaneously, an increase in fund flows. Hence, we
cannot separate the effect of both changes on the manager’s strategic decisions. To alleviate this concern,
we re-run the RDD test around the WSJ Discontinuity restricting the sample to funds with only no-load
shares. In this case, any change in the manager’s stock selection must be due to changes in fund flows,
because the subsample consists of pure no-load funds. Table A8 of the Appendix shows that, in that
case, all results vanish. We interpret this as evidence that it is not just the fund flows themselves that
drive our results in Table 9, but rather the variation in capital commitment.
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management and makes fund managers more willing to invest in arbitrage opportunities
that may be slow-moving (Duffie (2010)).
[Insert Table 9 about here ]
B Investor sophistication and Capital Commitment
To examine the effect of capital commitment on flow-performance sensitivity, we run a
regression as follows for every fund i and every quarter t:
FundF lows i,t = β0 + β1CommitmentDummy i,t + β2PerformanceRank i,t +
β3HighCapital Commitment i,t × PerformanceRank i,t + (9)
β4Controls i,t + µi,t + εi,t,
where Fund Flows is the net growth in fund assets beyond reinvested dividends over the
past one year. Commitment Dummy takes a value of one (zero) if the fund’s percentage of
capital commitment lies in the top (bottom) quartile of the sample in month t. Each fund
is given a quartile Performance Rank based on the fund’s gross performance in month
t, defined as the fund’s gross return net of the median value of the return of all funds
within the same investment objective. The controls are the same as in equation (1). µi,t
represents time and fund fixed effects to control for fund and time-specific unobservables
related to fund flows. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level.
Column 1 of Table 10 shows that, unconditionally, investors respond to better per-
formance (higher rank) with inflows. Our object of interest is the coefficient β3 on the
interaction term in equation (9). Funds with more committed capital are significantly
less sensitive to short-term performance.
We then break down the flow-performance sensitivity into gross performance terciles
(Low, Mid, and High Rank) in columns 2 through 5 to test whether investors’ capital
commitment exhibits more or less convexity in the response to fund performance. This
also allows us to test whether these investors are more or less sophisticated than the
average investor, as in Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) and Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel,
and Ramos (2012).
It is commonly accepted that bottom-ranked funds exhibit persistence in performance
(Carhart (1997)), but no persistence is observed in funds that come out on top in a
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particular year (Ippolito (1992); Sirri and Tufano (1998); Del Guercio and Tkac (2002)).
Therefore, if capital commitment is proxying for investor sophistication, we would expect
flows to respond negatively to the low-ranked funds; in other words, we would expect
them to flow out of the poorly performing funds and not react to the top-performing
ones.
The results fail to support the hypothesis of investor sophistication. Investors in
funds with high levels of committed capital react much the same as average investors
in the bottom-ranked funds, as the interaction terms between the performance bottom
tercile and capital commitment are not statistically significant. In the middle rank do we
observe a significant different reaction to performance among funds with higher capital
commitment, relative to the top rank where the reaction to performance is less strong
among investors with high levels of capital cimmitment.19
[Insert Table 10 about here ]
C Individual share class choice at the household level
The evidence at the aggregate fund level is consistent with the idea that higher capital
commitment is a proxy for a longer investment horizon or more patient capital. We cannot
rule out, however, that investors’ share class choice relates to other investor characteristics
(such as age, wealth, or sex) and not necessarily investment horizon. Also, managers may
use available information about personal traits to offer the most suitable share class to
a specialized fund clientele, again, independently of their investment horizon. Managers
may also infer investors’ horizon from other sources (Johnson (2004)). In such cases,
share classes would convey no relevant information to managers and should play no role
in their portfolio investment decisions.
To address these concerns, we borrow the data used by Barber and Odean (2001).
These data include information from a large discount brokerage firm on individual port-
folio decisions in accounts opened by 78,000 US households, from January 1991 through
December 1996. After we confine the sample to investors with portfolio holdings in at
least one mutual fund, the final sample includes the accounts of 27,536 households.
19The results remain robust when we control for funds with only no-load shares (No-load funds). This
suggests that we are not merely capturing structural differences between funds with and without load
share classes.
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We use these data to estimate a portfolio measure of turnover, following the same
methodology as in Barber and Odean (2001). We estimate the turnover of sales and
purchases independently. Monthly portfolio turnover is then defined as one-half of sales
turnover plus one-half of purchase turnover. To calculate the monthly sales turnover,
we match holding positions to sales during the month. The monthly sales turnover is
calculated as shares sold times beginning-of-month price per share divided by the total
beginning-of-month market value of the household’s portfolio. To calculate monthly
purchase turnover, we match these positions to purchases during the month. The monthly
purchase turnover is calculated as the shares purchased during the month times the end-
of-month price per share divided by the total end-of-month market value of the portfolio.20
We run, for each quarter t and household j, the regression:




j,t + β2Controls j,t + µj,t + ρj,t + εi,t,
where Hsj,t represents the percentage of investor j holdings invested in, respectively, share
class s={Front-Load, Back-Load, Level-Load, No-Load} in quarter t. The object of inter-
est is the coefficient βs1 for each share class s. We control for several household charac-
teristics potentially correlated with portfolio turnover: the investor’s marginal tax rate
(Tax ), Wealth, and indicator variables for sex (Male), age (Under 45 ), marital status
(Married), and whether the investor is a Homeowner. The data identify the household’s
investment style (conservative, income, growth, or speculation) and financial knowledge
(extensive, good, limited, or none). We include month × style (µj,t) and month × knowl-
edge (ρj,t) dummies. The independent variables are standardized. Standard errors are
clustered at the investor level. The results are shown in Table 11.
[Insert Table 11 about here ]
Portfolio turnover is lower among households with a higher proportion of holdings
invested in mutual fund front-end load shares. In particular, a one-standard-deviation
increase in the proportion of front-end load shares reduces portfolio turnover by 0.55%.
In economic terms, this reduction represents around 22% of the average turnover (2.5%).
20If more shares were sold than were held at the beginning of the month (an investor might have
purchased additional shares after the beginning of the month), we assume the entire beginning-of-month
position in that security was sold. Similarly, if more shares were purchased during the month than were
held in the position statement at month-end, we assume that the entire position was purchased during
the month. Thus, the estimated turnover cannot exceed 100% in a month.
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On the other side. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Wealthier investors and
investors with higher marginal tax rates also tend to show higher portfolio turnover.
These results support, at the household level, our hypothesis that investment in front-
end load shares tends to be associated with lower trading frequency, while investment
in level-load shares and no-load shares is associated with higher trading frequency. This
is true even after controlling for several personal investor characteristics (presumably
known to the manager). In other words, share class choice reveals additional information
to the manager about likely investor portfolio turnover and, potentially, their capital
commitment.
The results in Table 11 suggest that share class choice is a good predictor of the
household’s overall trade frequency. In the Appendix, we examine the turnover of the
portfolios of individual investors in our sample. Following the same methodology as in
Barber and Odean (2001), we estimate the monthly turnover of the holdings of 27,536
households in 1,001 mutual funds from January 1991 through December 1996. We then
regress turnover of fund i shares from investor j at time t against a dummy variable
Isi,j,t takes a value of 1 if fund i of investor j in month t is, respectively, in share class
s={Front-Load, Back-Load, Level-Load, No-Load}, zero otherwise. We control for fund
characteristics like Fund Size, Fund Age, Fund Fee, and dummy variables for Index Funds
and Equity Funds. We add household fixed effects (µj,t) to control for unobservable char-
acteristics at the individual investor level. Standard errors are clustered at the investor
level.
Results are presented in Table A9 of the Appendix. The turnover of front-end fund
shares is, on average, 0.07% lower than the average turnover in other fund classes, while
the level-load and no-load fund share turnovers are 0.18% and 0.07% higher, respectively.
Given that the average turnover of these securities is 0.3%, these measures are econom-
ically meaningful. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and robust
after controlling for several fund characteristics.
These results are consistent with our hypothesis that share class choice reveals in-
vestors’ capital commitment, here measured by the underlying investor turnover of both
their overall portfolios and their mutual fund investments. This evidence is robust af-
ter controlling for investor and fund characteristics. This supports our conjecture that
share class choice reveals additional information about the investor’s capital commitment
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beyond what a manager can potentially gather from investor characteristics.
D Alternative signaling mechanisms: Prospectus disclosure
Our data show that the percentage of no-load shares has been steadily increasing during
our sample period. The decoupling of financial advice and investment together with
a higher demand for passive (and cheaper) financial assets like exchange traded funds
(ETFs) in recent years has put strong pressure on mutual fund front- and back-end load
fees. Back-end load shares have practically disappeared while the proportion of level-load
shares, although still sizeable, exhibits a declining trend since 2005.
Given these trends, if information revealed through investors’ choice among load
shares is truly valuable to portfolio managers, we expect that funds will look for al-
ternative ways to infer investor horizons or attract investors with similar horizons. Is
there any evidence of alternative signaling mechanisms beyond fee structures? This is
the question we address in this section.
Mutual funds can communicate their investment strategy in their prospectus and semi
annual reports. If a fund family offers no-load shares, arguably losing a valuable channel
of information about investors’ capital commitment, we would expect its funds to be
more explicit in the prospectus about the manager’s investment horizon relative to funds
in families without no-load shares.
We download the prospectus reports (Form 485 BPOS) from Edgar and count the
number of times a fund explicitly mentions the word “long-term” as a signal of its in-
vestment horizon. In Table 12, we regress the number of times the word “long-term”
appears in the fund prospectus on an indicator variable, No-Load Family, that equals
one for funds in mutual fund families with a no-load distribution channel, zero otherwise.
We control for total word count as our key-word could simply mechanically appear more
frequently in longer prospectuses.
We find that funds in no-load families use the word “long-term” more frequently. In
fact, they mention it between four to six times more than funds in a family without no-load
classes. This is consistent with the idea that a fund family recognizes the importance of
signaling the investment horizon of a fund, particularly when the introduction of no-load
shares makes the share class choice of investors less informative about their investment
horizon. In other words, they recognize the importance of matching capital horizon to
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the underlying investor’s horizon and they present the information accordingly.
[Insert Table 12 about here ]
In the Appendix, we test an alternative signal that funds could use to inform investors
about their investment horizon, which could be establishment of a redemption fee. The
redemption fee is charged when investors withdraw money from a fund. This fee does not
go back into the pockets of the fund’s advisor but rather into the fund itself. Moreover,
unlike contingent deferred sales charges, redemption fees typically apply only in short,
specific periods, commonly 30, 180, or 365 days (although some redemption fees exist for
up to five years). Charges are waived after the stated time has passed. These fees are
typically imposed to discourage market-timers, whose quick movements into and out of
funds can be disruptive.
We controlled for the presence of a redemption fee in Table A5 to check the robustness
of Capital Commitment on the investment horizon of portfolio managers. Now, we want
to test explicitly whether funds use such a fee as a retention mechanism when the fund
has less capital commitment. In Table A10 we find support for this prediction. There is
evidence of a negative relation between Capital Commitment and the probability that a
fund has a redemption fee.
VI Conclusion
We have argued that mutual fund managers can extract valuable information on their
investment from investors choices among different sale charge fee structures. Investors
who choose funds with sizeable front- or back-end loads reveal a rational commitment to
hold their positions longer than investors who choose level-load shares or no-load shares.
We examine whether investors’ choice among sale charge fees has implications for
mutual funds, investors themselves, and the behavior of portfolio managers. We define
capital commitment as the proportion of a fund’s TNA invested in funds in front- or back-
end load share classes. We find that the lack of explicit capital commitment affects fund
trading horizon, stock selection, and in turn overall fund performance. The information
embedded in investor load fee choice helps managers deliver performance by efficiently
matching their investment choices to the underlying investment horizon of the retail
investor.
29
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3353344
Our results show evidence that mutual funds with more committed capital hold stocks
for longer periods, hold more iliquid stocks, and invest in long-term oriented firms. These
funds also take more advantage of mispriced stocks where convergence to fundamental
value is slow.
We document an important role for mutual fund charges in stabilizing flows, matching
investment horizon, and contributing to overall long-term performance. These concerns
are shared by the financial regulator in terms of protecting mutual fund shareholders
from volatile capital flows as well as preserving the liquidity needs of funds. Since 2016,
the SEC has allowed the use of swing or dual pricing, defined as “the process of adjusting
the fund’s net asset value (NAV) per share to effectively pass on the costs stemming from
shareholder purchase or redemption activity to the shareholders associated with that
activity” (amendments to rule 22c-1 of the Investment Company Act). Future research
could test whether this regulation might replace investor share class choice as a stabilizing
mechanism.
There is a common view that disintermediation benefits investors unconditionally;
that is, it is cost-saving. Our results suggest rather that a broker distribution channel
provides useful information about investors’ capital commitment. This helps managers
to make portfolio decisions that generate value for fund investors.
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Figure 1: Fraction of Total Net Assets (TNA) by Share Class
The figure shows the percentage of investor TNA in each share class and year across all
funds in the sample. We follow the Investment Company Institute (ICI) share classifi-
cation system and identify four share classes. Load shares are all retail. No-load shares
can be retail or institutional (including class R).
Figure 2: Fraction of Funds by Distribution Policy
The figure shows the percentage of funds in each type of distribution policy and year
in our sample. We classify a fund as Multi-class if the fund offers load and no-load
class options. Pure load (alternatively, Pure no-load) funds offer only load (alternatively,
no-load) shares. For the definition of load and no-load share class, see Figure 1.
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Figure 3: RDD Analysis of Post-Publication Fund Flows by Rank. All Share
Classes. Every quarter, funds in each category are sorted into ten ranks published by
WSJ the “Category Kings” (bins 0 through 10) and ten consecutive unpublished ranks
(bins 0 through -10) based on their performance over the last 12 months. The vertical
axis represents the fund net flows (as a percentage of TNA) regardless of share class over
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Figure 4: RDD Analysis of Post-Publication Fund Flows by Rank. Only Level-
Load Shares. Every quarter, funds in each category are sorted into ten ranks published
by WSJ the “Category Kings” (bins 0 through 10) and ten consecutive unpublished ranks
(bins 0 through -10) based on their performance over the last 12 months. The vertical axis
represents the fund net flows (as a percentage of TNA) corresponding only to level-load
class shares over the quarter following the publication of ranks.
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Figure 5: RDD Analysis of Post-Publication Fund Flows by Rank. Only No-
load Shares. Every quarter, funds in each category are sorted into ten ranks published
by WSJ the “Category Kings” (bins 0 through 10) and ten consecutive unpublished ranks
(bins 0 through -10) based on their performance over the last 12 months. The vertical axis
represents the fund net flows (as a percentage of TNA) corresponding only to No-load
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Quarterly Category Kings and Committed Assets
Figure 6: RDD Analysis of Post-Publication Fund TNA by Rank. Only
Capital Commitment. Every quarter, funds in each category are sorted into ten
ranks published by WSJ the “Category Kings” (bins 0 through 10) and ten consecutive
unpublished ranks (bins 0 through -10) based on their performance over the last 12
months. The vertical axis represents the fund TNA corresponding only to shares with
entry or exit load fees the quarter following the raking publication.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table reports mean, standard deviation, 25th-percentile, median, and 75th-percentile
of mutual fund share classes in Panel A, and fund characteristics in Panel B. The definition
of all variables is provided in Table A1 of the Appendix.
Panel A: Total Net Assets by Share Class
mean sd p25 p50 p75
Capital Commitment 31.70 39.56 0.00 1.94 72.90
Front Investors 26.24 34.95 0.00 0.84 52.32
Back Investors 5.46 14.99 0.00 0.00 0.85
Level Investors 19.46 33.08 0.00 1.70 19.97
No Load Investors 38.11 44.10 0.00 5.42 95.95
Panel B: Fund and Family Characteristics
mean sd p25 p50 p75
Fund TNA ($ million) 1948.01 6177.07 53.17 267.34 1287.11
Fund Size (log $ million) 5.49 2.32 3.97 5.59 7.16
Family Size (log $ million) 8.97 2.83 7.36 9.43 11.12
Family Funds (#) 161.37 212.43 13.00 74.00 240.00
Fund Age (years) 12.58 13.06 4.08 8.92 16.00
Expense Ratio (% per year) 1.28 0.49 0.98 1.23 1.53
Turnover Ratio (% per year) 89.39 98.68 33.00 64.00 111.00
Fund Cash(%) 4.52 7.09 0.75 2.66 5.70
Raw Return (% per month) 0.89 5.05 -1.49 1.18 3.72
Fund Performance (% annualized) 0.18 2.14 -0.79 0.13 1.07
Manager Tenure (log years) 1.76 0.72 1.23 1.78 2.24
Manager Evaluation Period (years) 3.20 0.74 3.00 3.00 3.00
Trading Duration (quarters) 5.14 3.63 2.46 4.16 7.01
Iliquidity (ratio) 1.38 5.08 0.01 0.07 0.37
Fund Flows(% per month) 2.16 12.13 -2.56 0.72 4.63
Total Flow Volatility (%) 3.51 6.30 0.64 1.50 3.49
Flow Prediction (%) 6.80 10.76 0.29 2.40 8.59
Front Load (%) 3.97 2.42 0.00 5.25 5.75
Back Load (%) 2.20 2.08 0.00 2.00 5.00
Institutional Investors (%) 21.86 35.57 0.00 0.00 31.26
Redemption Fee (%) 17.33 37.85 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 2: Flow Stability and Capital Commitment
The table presents the results of regressing the fund’s total flow volatility on the percent-
age of the fund’s TNA in different share classes and fund characteristics. The dependent
variables is the standard deviation of monthly inflows and outflows in the following 24
months. No-Load, Back, Front, and Institutional Investors represent the percentage of
fund TNA in the corresponding share classes. Capital Commitment is the percentage
of fund TNA in share classes with either front or back load fee. We standardize the
dependent variable and the main explanatory variables. The control variables are defined
in Table A1 of the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. * denotes
significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level.
Fund Flow Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)










Size (log(TNA)) -0.147∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗
(-14.36) (-14.23) (-14.37) (-14.28)
Family Size -0.017 -0.017 -0.013 -0.022
(-1.19) (-1.19) (-0.94) (-1.41)
Family Funds (log) 0.053∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(2.50) (2.50) (2.21) (2.65)
Expense Ratio 0.023 0.022 0.046 0.005
(0.67) (0.56) (1.21) (0.15)
Load Fee -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.07) (-0.06)
Fund Age (log) 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(3.90) (3.86) (3.97) (3.72)
Time x Style FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 77041 77041 77041 77041
Adjusted r2 0.133 0.133 0.135 0.134
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Table 3: Liquidity Management and Capital Commitment
The table presents the results of regressing Fund Flows Prediction on the percentage of
the fund’s TNA in different share classes and fund characteristics. The dependent variable
is the R-squared from regressing fund net flows on past cash holdings using 36 months of
observations. No-Load, Back, Front, and Institutional Investors represent the percentage
of fund TNA in the corresponding share classes. Capital Commitment is the percentage
of fund TNA in share classes with either front or back load fee. We standardize the
dependent variable and the main explanatory variables. The control variables are defined
in Table A1 of the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. * denotes
significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level.
Fund Flows Prediction
(1) (2) (3) (4)










Size (log(TNA)) 0.084∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(11.04) (10.85) (11.23) (11.01)
Family Size 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.002
(0.79) (0.72) (0.19) (0.20)
Family Funds (log) -0.021 -0.022 -0.010 -0.011
(-1.32) (-1.39) (-0.58) (-0.63)
Expense Ratio 0.080∗∗ 0.066∗ 0.046 0.054
(2.27) (1.80) (1.27) (1.48)
Load Fee 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011
(1.50) (1.51) (1.40) (1.54)
Fund Age (log) -0.070∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗
(-2.86) (-2.74) (-3.04) (-3.10)
Fund Flows 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.29) (0.39) (0.40) (0.15)
Time x Style FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 57584 57584 57584 57584
Adjusted r2 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.036
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Table 4: Trading Duration and Capital Commitment
The table reports the results of regressing the manager’s Trading Duration on the per-
centage of the fund’s TNA in different share classes and fund characteristics. Trading
Duration, introduced in Cremers and Pareek (2016), is based on quarter-end holdings
and measures the weighted-average (weighted by the size of each stock position) length
of time that the fund has held equities in the portfolio over the last five years. No-Load,
Back, Front, and Institutional Investors represent the percentage of fund TNA in the cor-
responding share classes. Capital Commitment is the percentage of fund TNA in share
classes with either front or back load fee. We standardize the dependent variable and
the main explanatory variables. The control variables are defined in Table A1 of the
Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. * denotes significance at the
10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1%
level.
Trading Duration
(1) (2) (3) (4)










Size (log(TNA)) 0.115∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(13.18) (13.04) (13.18) (13.11)
Family Size 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.015
(1.39) (1.33) (1.30) (1.09)
Family Funds (log) -0.123∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗
(-5.55) (-5.57) (-5.43) (-5.18)
Expense Ratio -0.238∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗
(-6.32) (-6.14) (-6.40) (-6.86)
Load Fee -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002
(-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.54) (-0.31)
Fund Cash 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.03) (0.09) (0.01) (-0.04)
Fund Flows -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(-9.08) (-9.12) (-9.07) (-9.24)
Time x Style FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 122481 122481 122481 122481
Adjusted r2 0.254 0.254 0.254 0.255
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Table 5: Fund Performance and Capital Commitment
The table reports the results of regressing the Fund Performance on the percentage of
the fund’s TNA in different share classes and fund characteristics. Fund performance
corresponds to the alpha obtained from the Carhart (1997) four factors model. We use
both gross (before fee) and net (after fee) returns. Capital Commitment is the percentage
of fund TNA in share classes with either front or back load fee. Institutional Investors
represent the percentage of fund TNA in the corresponding share classes. Noload Fund is
an indicator variable for funds without load share classes. We standardize the dependent
variable and the main explanatory variables. The control variables are defined in Table
A1 of the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. * denotes significance
at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at
the 1% level.
Fund Performance (Gross Returns) Fund Performance (Net Returns)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Commitment 0.022∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(2.29) (2.60) (2.70) (2.53) (2.79) (2.88)
Institutional Investors 0.013∗ 0.015∗ 0.012 0.014∗
(1.74) (1.90) (1.63) (1.78)
Noload Fund 0.050∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(2.20) (2.06)
Size (log(TNA)) -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗
(-5.77) (-5.53) (-5.46) (-5.86) (-5.62) (-5.55)
Family Size 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(2.47) (2.45) (2.35) (2.85) (2.83) (2.73)
Expense Ratio -0.098∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗
(-4.11) (-3.71) (-3.41) (-7.22) (-6.77) (-6.38)
Front Load -0.761∗∗ -0.947∗∗∗ -0.740∗ -0.787∗∗ -0.960∗∗∗ -0.760∗∗
(-2.22) (-2.61) (-1.94) (-2.31) (-2.65) (-1.99)
Back Load -0.077 -0.102 0.070 -0.026 -0.049 0.117
(-0.20) (-0.27) (0.18) (-0.07) (-0.13) (0.31)
Fund Cash 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗
(1.66) (1.70) (1.74) (1.73) (1.78) (1.81)
Fund Flows 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(25.67) (25.69) (25.70) (25.67) (25.68) (25.69)
Time x Style FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 135161 135161 135161 135161 135161 135161
Adjusted r2 0.215 0.215 0.215 0.215 0.215 0.215
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Table 6: Fund Performance and Capital Commitment
The table reports the results of regressing the Fund Performance on fund characteris-
tics. Fund performance corresponds to the alpha obtained by regressing buy-and-hold
portfolio returns on the corresponding buy-and-hold Carhart (1997) four factors with the
same holding horizon. The compounded alphas are then annualized. We decompose the
(standardized) trading duration of Cremers and Pareek (2016) into the part predicted
by the variable Capital Commitment and the part that is orthogonal to it. The residual
should capture the manager holding horizon choice, net of the capital commitment ob-
served among investors, and the predicted holding period captures the holding horizon
of fund managers due to investors’ supply of long-term capital. Capital Commitment is
the percentage of fund TNA in share classes with either front or back load fee. Institu-
tional Investors represent the percentage of fund TNA in the corresponding share classes.
Noload Fund is an indicator variable for funds without load share classes. The control
variables are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. The constant term is included but not
reported. The t-statistics adjusted for serial correlation using Newey and West (1987) are
reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance
at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Fund Performance
t t+12 t+24 t+36
Duration Predicted 0.377∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.138∗ 0.262∗∗∗
(4.08) (2.08) (1.92) (3.44)
Duration Residual 0.053∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.008 0.008
(6.03) (-1.23) (-1.48) (1.33)
Noload Fund 0.013 -0.038 -0.042 -0.041
(0.41) (-1.53) (-1.56) (-1.46)
Institutional Investors 0.022∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(2.49) (2.05) (3.10) (2.39)
Size (log(TNA)) -0.076∗∗∗ 0.014 0.023∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(-6.20) (1.56) (2.39) (2.16)
Family Size 0.032∗∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.005 0.005
(4.51) (1.74) (0.87) (0.85)
Expense Ratio 0.010 0.129∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.29) (5.11) (5.79) (5.89)
Front Load 0.115 -1.399∗∗∗ -1.405∗∗∗ -1.378∗∗∗
(0.28) (-4.66) (-4.44) (-4.39)
Back Load 0.340 -1.581∗∗∗ -1.832∗∗∗ -1.662∗∗∗
(0.82) (-5.23) (-5.58) (-4.84)
Fund Cash 0.001 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.57) (5.44) (5.94) (6.44)
Fund Flows 0.054∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(23.24) (15.72) (16.18) (12.41)
Time x Style FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 103760 103907 103907 103907
Adjusted r2 0.220 0.228 0.265 0.247
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Table 8: Portfolio Strategies and Capital Commitment
The table reports the results of regressing proxies for portfolio strategies on the fund’s
Capital Commitment. Illiquidity is the weighted average of the Amihud (2002) illiq-
uidity measure across portfolio stocks. R&D represents the portfolio’s value-weighted
average of R&D expense from Compustat, scaled by company assets. Patents is the
value-weighted number of patents from KPSS patent data (1926-2010) as obtained from
Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017) over assets. Fire-sale Stocks represents
the standardized outflow-induced funds selling pressure at the stock level as in Edmans,
Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), averaged (using value weights) across the fund portfolio.
These variables are measured during the next quarter. Capital Commitment is the per-
centage of fund TNA in share classes with either front or back load fee. We standardize
all the dependent variables and the main explanatory variables. The control variables
are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. Residuals are clustered at the fund level. *
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and ***
denotes significance at the 1% level.
Iliquidity R&D Patents Fire-sale Stocks
Capital Commitment 0.026∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.021∗
(2.01) (2.01) (2.26) (1.94)
Size (log(TNA)) -0.020∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.007 -0.032∗∗∗
(-3.24) (0.12) (-1.05) (-4.79)
Family Size -0.022 -0.036∗ -0.047∗∗∗ 0.012
(-1.22) (-1.88) (-2.58) (1.01)
Family Funds (log) -0.037∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.025 -0.049∗∗∗
(-1.65) (2.60) (1.12) (-2.80)
Load Fee 0.009∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.003
(1.71) (-2.46) (-2.17) (-0.54)
Past Year Returns -0.401∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗
(-5.81) (5.42) (3.94) (-9.04)
Flow Volatility 0.004∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(1.93) (4.02) (6.51) (4.36)
Time x Style FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 109675 109675 90167 109675
Adjusted r2 0.210 0.125 0.253 0.081
45
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3353344
Table 9: Stock Selection and WSJ Rankings: IV Approach
This table presents estimates of the effect of the fund’s capital commitment on managers’
stock selections using instrumental variables methods. In the first stage, the percentage
of fund TNA corresponding to shares with entry or exit load fees (Capital Commitment)
is instrumented with the WSJ Discontinuity from Kaniel and Parham (2017): a variable
that takes a value of one if the fund belongs to the 10 top funds in the “Category Kings”
ranking list of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), and zero otherwise. WSJ Rank denotes
the actual rank within the top 10. In the second stage, we repeat the regressions in
Table 8 after replacing Capital Commitment with the instrumented variable from the first
stage. Illiquidity is the weighted average of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure across
portfolio stocks. R&D represents the portfolio’s value-weighted average of R&D expense
from Compustat, scaled by company assets. Patents is the value-weighted number of
patents from KPSS patent data (1926-2010) as obtained from Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru,
and Stoffman (2017) over assets. Fire-sale Stocks represents the standardized outflow-
induced funds selling pressure at the stock level as in Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang
(2012), averaged (using value weights) across the fund portfolio. These variables are
measured during the next quarter. These variables are measured during the next quarter.
The control variables are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. Residuals are clustered
at the fund level. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the
5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.





Locked-up Predicted 0.396∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 0.485∗ 0.215
(2.00) (4.58) (1.82) (1.03)
Size (log(TNA)) -0.044∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.035∗∗∗
(-5.63) (3.62) (-0.36) (-4.64)
Family Size -0.048∗∗∗ 0.003 0.011 -0.043∗∗∗
(-3.28) (0.27) (0.74) (-3.52)
Family Funds (log) 0.066∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.029 0.055∗∗∗
(3.45) (-0.17) (-1.31) (2.87)
Load Fee 0.013∗∗∗ 0.003 0.008∗∗ 0.005
(2.68) (1.05) (2.00) (1.38)
Past Year Returns -0.158∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(-4.90) (8.54) (7.10) (-4.73)
Flow Volatility 0.002 0.006∗∗∗ 0.003 0.004∗∗∗
(1.06) (3.92) (1.50) (2.67)
Time x Style FE Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 87958 58827 58827 51584 58809
Adjusted r2 0.024 0.643 0.692 0.610 0.414
46
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3353344
Table 10: Fund Flows-Performance Sensitivity and Capital Commitment
The table reports the results of regressing the fund’s level of Fund Flows scaled by the
fund’s TNA. Commitment Dummy is an indicator variable that, for every fund and
quarter, takes a value of one (zero) if the fund’s fraction of TNA that is invested through
share classes with entry or exit loads (including front- and back-end load shares) is in
the top (bottom) quartile of the sample. Every quarter, each fund is given a quartile
Rank based on the fund’s gross performance, defined as the fund’s gross past 12 months
return net of the median value of that of all funds within the same investment objective.
In columns 2-5, funds are sorted into quarterly Low, Mid, and High (performance) rank
terciles based on their quarterly gross performance. The control variables are defined in
Table A1 of the Appendix. Residuals are clustered at the fund level. * denotes significance
at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at
the 1% level.
Fund Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Commitment Dummy 0.069∗∗∗ 0.053 0.059∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.041
(3.49) (1.52) (3.49) (2.92) (1.16)
Rank 0.323∗∗∗
(14.02)
Commitment Dummy x Rank -0.068∗∗
(-2.36)
Low Rank 0.845∗∗∗ 0.050
(5.96) (0.31)
Commitment Dummy x Low Rank -0.140 0.061
(-0.81) (0.31)
Mid Rank 0.378∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗
(13.76) (7.38)
Commitment Dummy x Mid Rank -0.080∗∗ -0.031
(-2.34) (-0.80)
High Rank 1.691∗∗∗ 1.170∗∗∗
(12.83) (8.23)
Commitment Dummy x High Rank -0.364∗∗ -0.342∗
(-2.15) (-1.87)
Size (log(TNA)) -0.043∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗
(-13.27) (-12.92) (-13.18) (-12.82) (-13.20)
Family Size 0.011∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.010∗
(1.90) (2.30) (1.99) (1.92) (1.80)
Family Funds (log) 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.011
(1.18) (0.70) (1.08) (1.39) (1.42)
Expense Ratio -0.045∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(-3.31) (-2.76) (-3.26) (-3.95) (-3.76)
Load Fee -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.20) (-0.18) (-0.24) (-0.04) (-0.10)
Fund Age (log) -0.104∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗
(-13.51) (-13.75) (-13.53) (-13.17) (-13.35)
Time x Style FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 77376 77376 77376 77376 77376
Adjusted r2 0.228 0.222 0.227 0.227 0.229
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Table 11: Household Portfolio Turnover and Share Classes
The table reports the results of regressing the portfolio turnover of individual investors
onto the mutual fund share classes choice. The dependent variable is the monthly portfo-
lio turnover for each household. Front-Load, Back-Load, Level-Load, and No-Load repre-
sent the fraction of investors’ portfolio assets invested in the corresponding mutual fund
share class. We standardize these explanatory variables. The control variables are the
investor’s marginal tax rate, wealth, and indicator variables for sex, age, marital status,
and homeownership. We include investment style (conservative, income, growth, and
speculation) times date, and investor knowledge (extensive, good, limited, none) times
date fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the investor level. Our sample includes
monthly observations for 27,536 individual investors who held at least one mutual fund
between January 1991 and December 1996. * denotes significance at the 10% level, **
denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Portfolio Turnover









Tax 1.141∗∗ 1.181∗∗ 1.153∗∗ 1.080∗∗
(2.39) (2.47) (2.41) (2.25)
Wealth (log) 0.027∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(2.21) (2.45) (2.51) (2.63)
Male -0.016 -0.023 -0.019 0.003
(-0.16) (-0.24) (-0.20) (0.03)
Under 45 0.057 0.049 0.042 0.038
(0.76) (0.65) (0.55) (0.50)
Married -0.030 -0.051 -0.050 -0.043
(-0.42) (-0.70) (-0.68) (-0.58)
Homeownership -0.046 -0.026 -0.030 -0.040
(-0.26) (-0.14) (-0.17) (-0.23)
Style x Time FE Y Y Y Y
Knowledge FE x Time FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 280,994 280,994 280,994 280,994
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.013
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Table 12: Investment Horizon Disclosure: Fund Prospectus
This table presents estimates of how explicit funds’ prospectus are regarding their in-
vestment horizon. The dependent variable is the number of times the word “long-term”
appears in the fund prospectus. The main explanatory variable (No-Load Family) is a
indicator variable for fund families with funds offered in no-load share classes. We also
include the natural logarithm of the total number of words in the fund’s prospectus (To-
tal Words). The remaining control variables are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix.
Residuals are clustered at the fund level. * denotes significance at the 10% level, **
denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Long-term Words
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No-Load Family 6.098∗∗ 7.734∗∗ 8.311∗∗∗ 8.472∗∗∗
(2.29) (2.58) (2.82) (2.82)
Total Words 28.100∗∗∗ 28.189∗∗∗ 28.041∗∗∗ 28.118∗∗∗
(7.44) (7.23) (7.35) (7.30)
Size (log(TNA)) 1.576 1.710 1.747
(1.36) (1.53) (1.53)
Family Size -0.553 -0.773 -0.812
(-0.82) (-1.08) (-1.12)
Expense Ratio 6.933 4.429 4.200
(1.38) (0.91) (0.85)
Load Fee -1.441 -1.177 -1.168
(-0.84) (-0.74) (-0.72)
Fund Age (log) -5.944∗ -4.939 -4.881
(-1.76) (-1.56) (-1.52)
Time FE Y Y Y N
Style FE N N Y N
Time FE x Style FE N N N Y
Observations 17914 17914 17914 17912
Adjusted r2 0.291 0.295 0.308 0.300
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Appendix
Table A1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Total Net Assets by Share Class
Capital Commitment Percentage of the fund’s total net asset (TNA) invested in shares with a front-end load > 1 percent (typically,
class A) or shares with no front-end load and a contingent deferred sales charge (CDSC) > 2 percent (typically,
class B).
Front Investors Percentage of the fund’s TNA invested in shares with a front-end load > 1 percent (typically, class A).
Back Investors Percentage of the fund’s TNA invested in shares with no front-end load and a contingent deferred sales charge
(CDSC) > 2 percent (typically, class B).
Level Investors Percentage of the fund’s TNA invested in shares with a front-end load ≤ 1 percent, CDSC ≤ 2 percent, and 12b-1
fee ≥ 0.25 percent.
No-load Investors Percentage of the fund’s TNA invested in shares with front-end load = 0 percent, CDSC = 0 percent, and 12b-1
fee < 0.25 percent.
Fund and Family Characteristics
Fund Age Number of years since fund inception date (years).
Fund Size Fund’s Total Net Assets (TNA) under management (USD Million).
Fund Performance Alpha from regressing buy-and-hold portfolio returns on the corresponding buy-and-hold Carhart (1997) four
factors with the same holding horizon.
Family Size TNA of all funds in the family, excluding the fund itself.
Family Funds Number of funds in the fund family.
Load Fee Average front or rear load fee (in %).
Redemption Fee Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the fund charges redemption fees.
Expense Ratio Total annual expenses and fees divided by year-end TNA (in %).
Turnover Minimum of aggregate purchases and sales of securities divided by average TNA over the calendar year (in %).
Institutional Investors Percentage of the fund’s TNA invested in institutional shares class
Fire-Sale Stocks Weighted average holding of the outflow-induced stock level pressure variable as in Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang
(2012), averaged across the fund portfolio. The stock-level measure captures the hypothetical (signed) net selling
by all mutual funds that have experienced outflows (of at least 5% of total assets). The dollar outflow is scaled
by the stock’s dollar trading volume.
Flow Volatility Standard deviation of monthly inflows and outflows in the following 24 months.
Flow Prediction R-squared from regressing fund flows on past cash holdings using 36 months of observations.
Fund Flows Net growth in fund assets beyond reinvested dividends (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) over the past one year (in %).
Trading Duration Weighted-average (weighted by the size of each stock position) of number of years the fund has held equities in
the portfolio over the last five years.
Manager Tenure Number of years since fund manager started working for the fund family.
Evaluation Period Average evaluation period for manager performance bonus.
Gross Returns Monthly portfolio gross return (in %). The gross monthly returns are computed by adding 1/12 of the expense
ratio.
Net Returns Monthly portfolio net return (in %).
Gross Performance Portfolio gross return minus the median value of the return of all the funds within the same investment objective
(in %).
Illiquidity Weighted average of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure across portfolio stocks.
R&D Portfolio’s value-weighted average of R&D expense from Compustat scaled by company assets (in %).
Pattens is the value-weighted number of patents from KPSS patent data (1926-2010) as obtained from Kogan, Papaniko-
laou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017) over assets.
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Table A2: Fund Flow Stability and Capital Commitment: Inflows vs. Outflows
The table reports the results of regressing fund flow volatility on investor capital commit-
ment and fund characteristics. The dependent variable, Flow Volatility, is the standard
deviation of monthly inflows, outflows, and net flows in the following 24 months, respec-
tively. Capital Commitment is the percentage of fund total net assets in share classes
with either front- or back-load fee. We standardize the dependent and main explanatory
variables. The control variables are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the fund level. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes
significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Fund Flow Volatility
Inflows Outflows Net Flows
Capital Commitment -0.105∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(-6.19) (-7.58) (-7.58)
Size (log(TNA)) -0.145∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗
(-14.90) (-14.16) (-20.47)
Family Size -0.020 -0.007 0.002
(-1.36) (-0.54) (0.13)
Family Funds (log) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.010 0.024
(2.99) (0.52) (1.10)
Expense Ratio 0.064∗ -0.006 0.004
(1.94) (-0.21) (0.11)
Load Fee 0.005 -0.008 -0.010
(0.74) (-1.31) (-1.60)
Fund Age (log) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(3.08) (5.52) (2.98)
Noload Fund 0.117∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗
(2.08) (2.71) (2.38)
Time x Style FE Y Y Y
Observations 77041 77041 77041
Adjusted r2 0.152 0.132 0.253
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Table A3: Trading Duration and Capital Commitment: Family Fixed Effects
The table reports the results of regressing the manager’s Trading Duration on the per-
centage of fund total net assets in share classes with either front or back load fee and fund
characteristics. Trading Duration, introduced in Cremers and Pareek (2016), is based on
quarter-end holdings and measures the weighted-average (weighted by the size of each
stock position) length of time that the fund has held equities in the portfolio over the last
five years. We standardize the dependent variable and the main explanatory variables.
The control variables are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the fund level. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at
the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Trading Duration
(1) (2) (3) (4)










Size (log(TNA)) 0.111∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(14.72) (14.71) (14.72) (14.67)
Family Size -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003
(-0.25) (-0.51) (-0.28) (-0.22)
Family Funds (log) -0.094∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗
(-3.42) (-3.52) (-3.40) (-3.39)
Expense Ratio -0.153∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗
(-4.55) (-5.02) (-4.62) (-4.61)
Load Fee -0.015∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(-2.27) (-2.22) (-2.28) (-2.25)
Fund Cash -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(-2.21) (-2.15) (-2.22) (-2.20)
Fund Flows -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(-11.03) (-11.09) (-11.02) (-11.03)
Time x Style FE Y Y Y Y
Family FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 122474 122474 122474 122474
Adjusted r2 0.412 0.413 0.412 0.412
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Table A4: Trading Duration and Capital Commitment: Alternative Duration Measures
The table reports the results of regressing alternative measures of manager holding hori-
zon on investors’ Capital Commitment. Turnover ratio is the minimum of aggregate
sales or purchases of stocks divided by the fund’s total net assets (as reported annu-
ally in CRSP). The other three measures come from Lan, Moneta, and Wermers (2015).
The first measure is the “simple” horizon measure (SHM), which calculates the holding
horizon of stocks in a given fund portfolio as the length of time from the initiation of
a position to the time that the stock is fully liquidated by the fund. The second mea-
sure is the “Ex-Ante” measure, which uses only current and past information. The third
measure (FIFO) allows for the possibility that position changes may also be informative
about the intended holding horizon and tracks inventory layers of each stock held by each
fund. It assumes that the stocks purchased first by a fund are sold first. Capital Commit-
ment is the percentage of fund TNA in share classes with either front or back load fee.
We standardize the dependent variable and the main explanatory variables. The control
variables are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the
fund level. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level
and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Alternative Duration Meassures
Turnover Duration SHM Duration Ex-ante Duration FIFO
Capital Commitment -0.080∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(-4.98) (2.10) (3.21) (2.82)
Size (log(TNA)) -0.060∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(-8.87) (11.29) (13.94) (11.88)
Family Size -0.047∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(-3.06) (2.38) (2.26) (2.82)
Family Funds (log) 0.133∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗
(6.04) (-6.93) (-6.87) (-7.47)
Expense Ratio 0.269∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(7.35) (-4.73) (-3.49) (-4.72)
Load Fee -0.005 0.011 -0.004 0.001
(-0.78) (1.33) (-0.55) (0.15)
Fund Cash 0.002 0.004∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(1.22) (2.33) (1.82) (2.98)
Fund Flows 0.002∗∗ -0.000 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.000
(2.44) (-1.24) (-12.02) (-1.15)
Noload Fund -0.016 -0.002 -0.045 -0.022
(-0.35) (-0.04) (-0.91) (-0.39)
Time x Style FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 129500 129500 129500 129500
Adjusted r2 0.097 0.149 0.226 0.152
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Table A5: Trading Duration and Capital Commitment: Additional Controls
The table reports the results of regressing the manager’s Trading Duration on the per-
centage of fund TNA in share classes with either front or back load fee and fund char-
acteristics. Trading Duration, introduced in Cremers and Pareek (2016), is based on
quarter-end holdings and measures the weighted-average (weighted by the size of each
stock position) length of time that the fund has held equities in the portfolio over the last
five years. Capital Commitment is the percentage of fund TNA in share classes with ei-
ther front or back load fee. Institutional Investors represent the percentage of fund TNA
in the corresponding share classes. Noload Fund is an indicator variable for funds without
load share classes. Redemption Fee is a dummy variable for funds that charge a fee when
investors redeem their shares. Manager Evaluation Period is number of years over which
manager performance is evaluated. The control variables are defined in Table A1 of the
Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. * denotes significance at the
10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1%
level.
Trading Duration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Commitment 0.052∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(3.13) (2.38) (2.37) (3.88) (3.92) (3.94)
Redemption Fee 0.039 0.034 0.035
(1.02) (0.91) (0.92)
Manager Evaluation Period 0.115∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(2.27) (2.34) (2.28)
Institutional Investors -0.042∗∗ -0.042∗∗ 0.028 0.030
(-2.49) (-2.46) (0.87) (0.91)
Noload Fund 0.006 0.054
(0.13) (0.52)
Size (log(TNA)) 0.115∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(13.21) (13.13) (13.01) (8.40) (8.48) (8.48)
Family Size 0.019 0.015 0.015 0.071∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(1.42) (1.13) (1.11) (2.70) (2.73) (2.63)
Family Funds (log) -0.122∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(-5.49) (-5.14) (-5.09) (-4.71) (-4.72) (-4.56)
Expense Ratio -0.241∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗
(-6.51) (-7.01) (-6.89) (-4.41) (-4.13) (-4.00)
Load Fee -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005
(-0.58) (-0.35) (-0.32) (0.32) (0.26) (0.34)
Fund Cash 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.01) (-0.06) (-0.05) (2.06) (2.07) (2.09)
Fund Flows -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(-9.06) (-9.22) (-9.22) (-5.15) (-5.12) (-5.13)
Time x Style FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 122481 122481 122481 30719 30719 30719
Adjusted r2 0.254 0.255 0.255 0.316 0.316 0.316
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Table A6: Fund Performance and Trading Duration
The table reports the results of regressing fund performance on the Cremers and Pareek
(2016) measure of Trading Duration and some fund characteristics. Trading duration is
based on quarter-end holdings and measures the weighted-average (weighted by the size
of each stock position) length of time that the fund has held equities in the portfolio
over the last five years. Fund performance corresponds to the alpha obtained from the
Carhart (1997) four factors model. We use both gross (before fee) and net (after fee)
returns. Capital Commitment is the percentage of fund TNA in share classes with either
front or back load fee. Institutional Investors represent the percentage of fund TNA in
the corresponding share classes. Noload Fund is an indicator variable for funds without
load share classes. We standardize the dependent variable and the main explanatory
variables. The control variables are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. Standard
errors are clustered at the fund level. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes
significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Fund Performance (Gross Returns) Fund Performance (Net Returns)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trading Duration 0.059∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(8.00) (8.13) (8.03) (8.12) (8.22) (8.12)
Institutional Investors 0.012∗ 0.012∗ 0.010 0.011
(1.67) (1.76) (1.47) (1.55)
Noload Fund 0.038∗ 0.036
(1.70) (1.55)
Size (log(TNA)) -0.035∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(-7.04) (-6.83) (-6.76) (-7.17) (-6.97) (-6.90)
Family Size 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(3.53) (3.56) (3.47) (3.91) (3.94) (3.84)
Expense Ratio -0.068∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(-2.99) (-2.46) (-2.23) (-6.26) (-5.59) (-5.28)
Front Load -0.186 -0.257 -0.082 -0.159 -0.221 -0.056
(-0.63) (-0.85) (-0.25) (-0.53) (-0.73) (-0.17)
Back Load 0.082 0.084 0.219 0.147 0.148 0.276
(0.22) (0.23) (0.58) (0.40) (0.40) (0.74)
Fund Cash 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗
(1.70) (1.76) (1.78) (1.79) (1.83) (1.86)
Fund Flows 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(25.55) (25.56) (25.57) (25.54) (25.55) (25.56)
Time x Style FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 135161 135161 135161 135161 135161 135161
Adjusted r2 0.215 0.215 0.215 0.216 0.216 0.216
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Table A7: Differences in Means from the WSJ “Category Kings” Discontinuity
This table shows the differences in means in the quarter after funds are ranked 10 rela-
tive to 11 following the Wall Street Journal “Category Kings” ranking list from Kaniel
and Parham (2017). All variables are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. * denotes
significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level.
T-Test Analysis: Ranked 10 vs Ranked 11
Ranked 10 Ranked 11 Difference
Next Quarter Flows 12.083 7.563 4.520∗
Next Quarter Load-Level Flows 23.940 12.456 11.484∗∗
Next Quarter Locked-up Flows 15.844 10.909 4.936
Next Quarter No-Load Flows 16.047 13.464 2.582
Next Year Turnover 0.939 0.905 0.034
Next Year Duration 4.718 5.276 -0.557∗
Next Year Active Share 0.865 0.841 0.024∗∗
Next Year Evaluation Period 4.513 4.755 -0.243
Next Quarter Locked up Assets -0.151 -0.032 -0.118∗
Next Quarter NoLoad Assets 0.002 -0.067 0.068
Next Quarter Level Assets 0.161 0.045 0.115
Observations 1093
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Table A8: Stock Selection and WSJ Rankings: Only No-Load Funds
The table reports the results of regressing proxies for portfolio strategies on the variable
WSJ Discontinuity from Kaniel and Parham (2017): a variable that takes a value of one
if the fund belongs to the 10 top performance funds in the “Category Kings” ranking
list of the Wall Street Journal and zero otherwise. Illiquidity is the weighted average
of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure across portfolio stocks. R&D represents the
portfolio’s value-weighted average of R&D expense from Compustat, scaled by company
assets. Patents is the value-weighted number of patents from KPSS patent data (1926-
2010) as obtained from Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017) over assets.
Fire-sale Stocks represents the standardized outflow-induced funds selling pressure at the
stock level as in Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), averaged (using value weights)
across the fund portfolio. These variables are measured during the next quarter. The
subsample includes only Pure No-Load funds (funds with only no-load class shares). The
control variables are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. Residuals are clustered at the
fund level. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level
and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Iliquidity R&D Patents Fire-sale Stocks
Discontinuity -0.025 -0.014 -0.038 0.025
(-0.90) (-0.62) (-0.86) (0.66)
Rank 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.001∗∗∗
(3.49) (-0.78) (-1.02) (3.75)
Size (log(TNA)) -0.037∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.023
(-3.22) (3.10) (0.17) (-1.20)
Family Size -0.058∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗ -0.002 -0.022
(-2.75) (2.27) (-0.07) (-0.67)
Family Funds (log) 0.062∗∗ -0.066∗ 0.002 0.018
(2.20) (-1.77) (0.05) (0.65)
Flow Volatility -0.002 0.005∗∗ 0.004 0.002
(-1.10) (2.33) (1.47) (0.73)
Time x Style FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 17236 17236 14777 17233
Adjusted r2 0.699 0.742 0.633 0.487
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Table A9: Household Mutual Fund Holdings Turnover and Share Classes
The table reports the results of regressing the turnover of mutual fund shares on several
fund characteristics. The dependent variable is the monthly turnover of mutual fund
shares held by each household. Front-Load, Back-Load and Level-Load, and No-Load are
indicator variables for the corresponding mutual fund share classes. The control variables
are mutual fund size, fee, age and indicator variables for index and US equity fund. We
include investor times month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the investor
level. Our sample includes monthly observations for 1,001 US mutual funds and 27,536
individual investors with holdings in at least one mutual fund from January 1991 to
December 1996. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the
5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Security Turnover









Fund Size -0.021∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(-5.43) (-5.90) (-6.37) (-5.98)
Fund Fee -0.087∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗
(-8.60) (-9.43) (-10.22) (-8.36)
Fund Age -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(-12.35) (-12.78) (-13.03) (-12.94)
Index Fund -0.064∗∗ -0.064∗∗ -0.072∗∗ -0.060∗∗
(-2.22) (-2.20) (-2.44) (-2.04)
Equity Fund -0.093∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗
(-12.36) (-12.53) (-12.71) (-11.35)
Investor x Time FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,652,525 2,652,525 2,652,525 2,652,525
Adjusted R2 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.853
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Table A10: Redemption Fee and Capital Commitment
This table presents estimates of the probability that a fund charges a redemption fee on
the fund’s capital commitment, using a linear probability model. Capital Commitment
is the (standardized) percentage of fund total net assets in share classes with either
front or back load fee. The control variables are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix.
Residuals are clustered at the fund level. * denotes significance at the 10% level, **
denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Redemption Fee
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Commitment -0.044∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(-5.95) (-6.97) (-6.19) (-6.24)
Size (log(TNA)) 0.001 0.002 0.003
(0.23) (0.62) (0.65)
Family Size -0.021∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(-5.34) (-6.02) (-5.98)
Expense Ratio 0.115∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(6.91) (5.04) (5.05)
Load Fee 0.006∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(1.68) (2.03) (2.04)
Fund Age (log) 0.007 0.007 0.008
(0.73) (0.71) (0.81)
Time FE Y Y Y N
Style FE N N Y N
Time FE x Style FE N N N Y
Observations 135692 135692 135692 135671
Adjusted r2 0.017 0.062 0.079 0.076
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